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ABSTRACT 
 his study examined the effects of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) among firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Forty firms were selected for the study using judgmental sampling technique. A content analysis of information in the corporate annual reports and websites of the selected firms for the period 2006-2010 provided data for the study. CSED was measured using 50 items of information and CG mechanisms examined were CEO duality, Board size, proportion of non-executive directors and audit size. Data obtained were analyzed using correlation and regression analysis. Findings revealed a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and CSED; and significant positive relationships between proportion of non- executive directors, board size, audit size and CSED. The study concluded that an effective board with higher number of non executive directors (independent directors) and larger size and higher quality audits will be more supportive of firms disclosing a wider range of information to stakeholders including social and environmental information.  
Keywords: CEO duality, Proportion of non-executive directors, Board size, Audit size, Social and Environmental Disclosure, Nigerian Stock Exchange  
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1. Introduction  
 
Corporate social and environmental disclosure as a concept has attracted considerable attention among 
corporate organizations, policy makers and researchers as a phenomenon spurred by the globalisation trends. 
A large number of firms around the world are engaged in efforts to describe and integrate corporate social 
and environmental reporting into various aspects of their businesses. In the United States, more than half of 
the Fortune 1,000 companies regularly issue corporate social and environmental reports (Pramanik, Shil and 
Das, 2008). McWilliams and Siegel (2001) described social and environmental reporting as the process of 
communicating the social and environmental effects of organizations’ economic actions to particular interest 
groups within the society and to the society at large. It involves extending the accountability of organisations 
(particularly) companies; beyond the traditional role of providing a financial account to the owners of capital. 
Corporate social and environmental disclosure is generally seen, as an extension of firms' efforts to foster 
effective corporate governance, ensuring the sustainability of firms through sound business practices that 
promote accountability and transparency. Thus, it is a conceptual framework that recognizes that a viable 
relationship exists between an organisation’s economic performance and its environmental and social 
activities.  
 
Environmental problems have become major headlines due to the negative effects they bring to the stability 
of the ecosystem. Thus, the increased awareness of social responsibility or, specifically, environmental 
concern is now a challenge facing the corporate world. Although the subject of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure was proposed in the early 20th century, great importance was not attached to it  
until an outbreak of a series of events. Some of these outbreaks include the Union Carbide chemical leak in 
Bhopal, India in 1984, the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster in Alaska in 1989, the tainted milk incident 
involving the Japanese Snow Brand Diary Company in 2000, the Chinese Sanlu melamine milk poisoning 
incident in 2008, the ExxonMobil oil spill Nigeria in 2010, the Golf of Mexico oil spill in 2010 and the 
recent Mayflower and Mississippi oil spillage in 2013. This however, highlights the issue of insufficient 
labor rights protection in developing countries.  
 
Similarly, corporate scandals in high profile companies such as WorldCom, Enron and Tyco, have raised the 
question of the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms in organizations (Ionel-Alin, 2012). It is therefore 
argued that the focus should now be more on improving the internal mechanism, particularly to increase 
shareholder’s insight and influence on corporate behaviour in organizations (Kolk, 2006). These series of 
scandals involving major enterprises suggest that more stakeholders will suffer if corporate social and 
environmental reporting is not sufficiently recognized.  
 
Prior studies in recent years have provided insights into the number of companies disclosing social and 
environment-related information. However, much of the literature to date has been focused on the 
experience of companies in the industrialized countries, mostly of Europe and United States (Nassr and 
Fathi 2010). In addition, prior studies have suggested that although corporate governance and corporate 
social and environmental reporting have separately established themselves as well-researched areas; 
relatively less attention has been paid to setting up a link between the two concepts (Gibbins, Richardson & 
Waterhouse, 1990; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Hence, this study attempts to address this gap in literature by 
examining the effects of specific corporate governance variables on the level of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure among firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  
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The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: following this introductory section is the literature 
review and hypotheses development. Subsequent to this are four sections that detail the research 
methodology, the results, the discussion of  findings and the conclusion emanating from the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses development 
 
2.1. Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting  
Corporate social and environmental reporting may be described as the systematic disclosure of social and 
environmental effects of organisations’ economic action to particular interest groups within society and the 
society at large (Gray, Owen & Manders, 1987). Businesses can disclose their social and environmental 
impact through voluntary and mandatory disclosures in their annual reports.  Corporate social and 
environmental disclosure appears to be one of the most important new worldwide governance practices, with 
many governance principles now recognizing the importance of addressing issues regarding the well-being 
of the society. It is basically pictured as reflecting the evolution of companies’ governance systems from a 
shareholder perspective to reflect broader stakeholders concerns (Igalens and Point, 2009).  
 
For decades, the economic and political dimensions of environmental governance and change have been at 
the centre of national and international public policy and academic debates, however, the social impacts of 
environmental change and the inadequacy of policies in addressing these issues have remained at the 
margins of academic research. Although their relevance has been emphasized and reaffirmed in the 
Brundtland Report 1987, the Millennium Development Goals, 2001 and the Doha 2012 UN Climate Change 
Conference, they remain fringe issues in the global discourse on sustainable development. Nevertheless, the 
increasingly evident phenomenon of climate change attributed to cumulative human activities such as green 
house gas emissions, deforestation and over exploitation of non-renewable resources have all generated 
enormous pressure on business and corporations to reconsider their business strategies and activities so as to 
deliberately minimize the impact on the environment in which they operate. It follows therefore that for any 
business corporation to operate successfully, it must necessarily 
operate or implement business models that assure least significant environmental footprint.  
 
Notwithstanding the growing academic debates, very few studies are available on the corporate social and 
environmental reporting practices of developing countries, since corporate social and environmental 
reporting is done on a voluntary basis. Most of the available studies were conducted in the context of 
industrialized economies focusing their attention on identifying various factors that influence companies to 
disclose environmental information. Among the factors identified in prior literature were company size, 
corporate image enhancement, liquidity and firm performance (Deegan, Rankin and Voughts, 2000). It is 
thus evident that one important gap in both corporate governance and corporate social and environmental 
reporting literature is the paucity of such research in the context of emerging economies like Nigeria. Hence, 
the focus of this study on determining the effects of corporate governance mechanism on the level of 
corporate social and environmental disclosures among listed firms in Nigeria.  
 
2.2. Corporate Governance mechanism and Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting  
The Cadbury Committee (1992) defined corporate governance as the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled. Corporate social and environmental reporting (an important component of corporate 
social responsibility) has increasingly focused on corporate governance as a vehicle for incorporating social 
and environmental responsibilities into the business decision-making process, benefiting not only financial 
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investors, but also employees and communities (Kolk, 2006). Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) argued 
that the two concepts of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility should not be considered 
and sustained independently. More so, corporate governance is presently moving from its conventional 
focus on agency conflicts to addressing issues of ethics, accountability, transparency and disclosure (Igalens 
and Point, 2009). Hence, Dutta and Bose (2008) opined that disclosures on corporate and environmental 
issues has the potential to increase shareholder’s wealth and can be regarded as one of the elements of good 
corporate governance.  As Igalens and Point (2009) noted, the effectiveness of regulation on environmental 
risk, which emphasizes awareness and empowerment of shareholders, essentially depends on the quality of 
the corporate and environmental disclosure. Very little literature however exists which covers the disclosure 
of corporate social and environmental governance especially in developing countries. 
 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
The agency theory literature provides a framework to study the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and corporate social and environmental disclosures, since both can be considered as control 
mechanisms. The agency theory argues that the separation of ownership from control of business gives rise 
to the tendency of managers to seek to maximize their own utility and pursue interest in conflict to that of 
owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In order to reduce these conflicts and their adverse effects on firm value, 
a variety of corporate governance mechanisms have been devised to keep corporate managers in check. 
From this perspective, the corporate governance mechanisms should encourage transparent disclosure of 
information about the firm to reduce information asymmetry and thereby reduce conflicts between 
management and shareholders. Initially, the agency theory was applied to the relationship between managers 
and shareholders but subsequent research widened its scope to include other stakeholders (Sanda, Mikailu & 
Garba, 2005). The disclosure of social and environmental impact of business activities addresses issues 
relating to the welfare of all stakeholders and may therefore be viewed from this perspective.   
 
Several corporate governance mechanisms have been suggested in literature. These according to Gillan et al. 
(2007) are categorized into internal mechanisms which include management and its board of directors, 
charter provisions, inside ownership, block holders, and external mechanisms including market for corporate 
control, legal and regulatory rules and investor monitoring.  Majority of corporate governance literature has 
alluded to the importance of the role of the board of directors in monitoring management. The effectiveness 
of the board has therefore been at the centre of corporate governance debate (Jensen 1993; Babatunde and 
Olaniran 2009; Fama and Jensen, 1883). Board independence is argued to be a major contributory factor to 
the effectiveness of the board. An independent board is expected to be in a position to bring pressure to bear 
on management to ensure transparent disclosure of material information.  Board size and board composition 
have been suggested as critical influences on board independence. Two elements of board composition 
argued to be important for its independence are the separation of the roles of chief executive officer (CEO) 
and chairman of the board (Florackis & Ozkan (n.d.) and higher proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board (The Cadbury Committee, 1992). However, research results have not been consistent on these. As 
Babatunde and Olaniran further noted, while these internal mechanisms are necessary for efficiency, they 
are not sufficient for good governance; in addition to these, external governance mechanisms are also 
important for disciplined corporations in market economies. High quality audit has been argued to be one of 
the most effective external governance mechanisms for reducing agency conflicts arising from information 
asymmetry. The Cadbury Report (1992) affirmed that the annual audit is one of the cornerstones of 
corporate governance. High quality audit is expected to ensure transparent disclosure of all material facts 
about the activities of the firm. These arguments informed the focus of this study on finding out the nature of  
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the effects of three internal corporate governance mechanisms; board size, CEO duality and proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board and one external governance mechanism; audit size (as proxy for audit 
quality) on disclosure of social and environmental information. 
 
2.3.1 Board size 
In relation to board effectiveness in monitoring management, it has been argued that large boards are more 
powerful than small boards and can help strengthen the link between corporations and their environments 
(Zahra 1991).  It is expected that large board will be able to maintain independence from the board and 
thereby encourage management to disclose more information. Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999) 
opined that larger boards potentially bring more experience and knowledge and offer better advice as they 
are more likely to include experts on specific issues such as environmental performance. Buniamin, Alrazi, 
Johari and Rahman (2008) based on the content analysis for 243 Malaysian companies stock listed provided 
evidence that board size has a significant influence on the level of environmental reporting. Akhtaruddin, 
Hossain, M.A., Hossain, M. and Yao (2009) also suggested a positive association between the size of the 
board and the reporting of voluntary information. 
 
On the other hand, studies have argued that large boards are less effective than small boards. The basis 
advanced for such argument is the difficulty that large groups of directors may pose in terms of coordination 
and decision making. Less effective monitoring is expected when the monitoring group is not coordinated. 
Studies have provided empirical evidence based on these arguments. Byard, Li and Weintrop (2006) 
supporting this view reported a negative relationship between board size and disclosure. The study found 
that financial disclosure decreased with board size while Cheng and Courtenay (2006) indicated that board 
size has no relationship with voluntary disclosure. 
 
2.3.2 CEO Duality 
The Cadbury Committee (1992) recommended as an element of good corporate governance, the separation 
of the role of Chief executive officer (CEO) from that of the Chairman of the board. CEO duality refers to 
the absence of this separation of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman. Fama and Jensen, (1983) argued 
that since CEO duality signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision control, the 
board will be unable to effectively monitor and evaluate the CEO. CEO duality according to Kula (2005) 
compromises the desired system of checks and balances and represents a conflict of interests, thus reducing 
the level of accountability and transparency. Studies including Gul and Leung (2004); Ho and Wong (2001) 
have reported a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and the separation of the role of CEO and 
board chairman implying that firms with CEO duality are more likely to be associated with poorer disclosure. 
However empirical research on the relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure by Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006) reported no significant relationship while Sanchez, Dominguez and Alvarez (2011) in 
analysing the disclosure practices of Spanish companies in relation to a voluntary typology of strategic 
information to determine the factors that explain these practices found that corporate disclosure was high 
where the chairperson of the board is the same person as the CEO implying a positive relationship between 
CEO duality and social and environmental disclosure. 
 
2.3.3 Proportion of non-executive directors  
Agency theory suggests that boards with a higher proportion of independent directors work in the best 
interests of the minority shareholders in order to maintain their own good reputation in society (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). The Cadbury Committee (1992) affirmed the need for a higher proportion of non-executive 
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directors to executive directors on the board. Consistent with this view, Florackis and Ozkan (n.d.) argued 
that boards with a significant proportion of non-executive directors can limit the exercise of managerial 
discretion by exploiting their monitoring ability and protecting their reputations as effective and independent 
decision makers. In support of this line of argument, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) indicated a positive 
association between the ratio of independent, non-executive managers within the board and the voluntarily 
reported information. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found that the proportion of independent directors is 
directly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure and that the existence of a corporate governance 
mechanism and environmental rules would increase the power of the relationship between proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure. It can thus be argued that 
inclusion of higher proportion of non-executive on the board would result in more individuals having the 
incentive to protect their reputation by promoting higher transparency through disclosure of material 
information including social and environmental impact of business activities. 
 
2.3.4 Audit Size 
The agency theory suggests that auditing is one of those important mechanisms put in place to align the 
interest of agents with their principals. The audit provides an external and objective check on the way in 
which the financial statements have been prepared and presented (The Cadbury Committee, 1992). It lends 
credibility to disclosures in the financial reports, thus serving a fundamental purpose in promoting 
confidence and trust in information contained in the reports. It therefore follows that the effectiveness of an 
audit process is critical to the disclosure of relevant information in financial reports. Monroe & Tan (1997) 
attested to this when they opined that the quality of an audit can affect the reliability of audited financial 
information.   Palmrose (1988) also argued that higher quality audits are associated with absence of material 
omissions or misstatements in the financial statements. By implication, appropriate social and environmental 
disclosure should be promoted by higher quality audits. Prior literature has measured quality of audit using 
various proxies including audit fees (O’ Sullivan, 2000; Boo & Sharma, 2008); non-audit fees (Li and Lin 
2005)  and audit firm size (Chau & Gray, 2002, Lin & Liu, 2009).  However, the most commonly used 
proxy is audit firm size (Kilgore, 2007). Larger audit firms are believed to be associated with higher audit 
quality because of the greater reputation they have at stake, larger clients’ base and larger resources to 
employ highly skilled auditors. Studies have found evidence suggesting that larger audit firms are associated 
with higher voluntary disclosure. Ho and Wong (2001) analyzed the relationship between corporate 
governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong Stock Exchange. They observed 
that the existence of an auditor is significantly and positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Chau and Gray (2002) also found that firms audited by the larger audit firms disclosed more information 
voluntarily. 
 
2.4. Hypotheses 
 
Based on the agency theory foundation and the foregoing arguments as highlighted in the preceding 
discussions, the following null hypotheses were formulated and tested: 
H01: there is no significant relationship between CEO duality and the level of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure among listed firms in Nigerian.  
 
H02: there is no significant relationship between audit size and the level of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure among listed firms in Nigerian. 
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H03: there is no significant relationship between the proportion of independent directors in the board 
and the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure among listed firms in Nigerian. 
 
H04: there is no significant relationship between board size and the level of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure among listed firms in Nigerian. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
The population of interest in this study comprised of all 244 firms listed on the floor of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange as at 31 December 2010. However, the study made use of a selected sample of 40 listed firms 
(constituting a percentage of about 16.4% of the total population under review) whose activities directly or 
indirectly have significant impact on the environment due to their mode of operation. The sample size 
chosen is in line with the suggestion of Kerjice and Morgan (1970) that a minimum of 5% of a defined 
population is considered as an adequate sample size required for generalization. The judgemental sampling 
technique which is a non probabilistic sampling technique was used in selecting the sample firms based on 
availability of the financial reports covering all the years under review and the researcher’s judgement on the 
impact of the activities of the firms on their environment. The study made use of secondary data contained 
in the annual reports and corporate websites of the selected firms. This is due to the fact that corporate 
websites and annual reports are the main corporate documentary sources widely used as the communication 
media for conveying corporate activities to stakeholders. The annual reports for period 2006-2010 were used 
due to the increased level of awareness and pressure from stakeholders within these periods. Content 
analysis was used in eliciting the data contained in the corporate annual reports and websites. This method is 
one of the most systematic, objective and quantitative methods of data analysis technique employed in other 
prior research studies involving corporate environmental disclosures practices (Krippendorf, 2004). In order 
to effectively manage the number of observation in this study, the data obtained for each of the identified 
variables under review were averaged for the period 2006-2010 for each of the sampled firms. 
 
Adapting some of the disclosure indexes used in related literatures (e.g. Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Nassr and 
Fathi 2010), fifty (50) content category items within five (5) testable dimensions of environmental 
disclosure were developed for coding based on the ISO 14031 requirements. These disclosure indexes as 
summarised (See Appendixes 1 & 2) include theme, evidence, location in annual report/corporate website, 
news type and time. A dichotomous procedure known as the Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD) social 
environmental performance rating system was used to measure the reporting score (RS) on the 50 content 
category items. A score of one (1) was awarded if an item was reported; otherwise a score of zero (0) is 
awarded. Thus, a firm could score a maximum of fifty (50) points and a minimum of zero (0). The formula 
for calculating the reporting score by using these 50 attributes is expressed in a functional form a follows:  
50 
RS  =  Σ ri 
     i = 1 
Where:  
RS =  Reporting Score  
ri =  A score of (1) if the item is reported and (0) if the item is not reported 
 i  =  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 ... 50.  
 
In order to measure the relationships between the independent variables (CEO duality, audit size, proportion 
of non-executive directors, board size) and the dependent variable (corporate social and environmental 
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disclosure), correlation analysis and the ordinary least square regression analysis were utilized. The 
regression model adopted as shown below in functional and explicit forms:   
Model Specification 
CSEDt  = f (CEODUALt, AUDSIZEt, PNEDt, BSIZEt FSIZEt Ut)……………………………………… (1) 
 
This can be written in explicit form as: 
 
CSEDt = β0 + β1CEODUALt + β2AUDSIZEt + β3PNEDt, + β4BSIZEt + β5FSIZEt + Ut………. (2)  
 
Where:  
CSEDt  = Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure Index.  
CEODUALt  = CEO Duality data was coded as a binary variable. If the CEO and  Board Chairman  
   positions were held by the same person, then it is accepted that CEO Duality existed and 
this is coded with a score of (1) and otherwise, it was coded as (0).  
AUDSIZEt   = Audit size (in terms of the big four audit firms in Nigeria). Audit size was set to be equal to 
one (1) if the information obtained from companies audited reports show that it is audited by 
one of the “big 4” audit firms (i.e. KPMG; Ernst and Young; Akintola Williams Delloitte; 
PWC), otherwise zero (0). 
 
PNEDt  = Proportion of non executive directors divided by total number of directors on the   
                             board (%) 
BSIZEt  = Total number of members on the board directors. 
 
FSIZEt  = Firm Size is measured by the Log of total asset (Control Variable). 
 
U   = Stochastic or disturbance term.  
t   = Time dimension of the Variables  
β0  = Constant or Intercept.  
β1 - 4   = Coefficients to be estimated or the Coefficients of slope parameters. 
The expected signs of the coefficients (i.e. a priori expectations) are such that β1 < 0; while β2, β3, β4 >0.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
Results from the descriptive statistics as shown in table 1, indicate a mean corporate social and 
environmental disclosure (CSED) level of about 24.29 for the selected firms under consideration 
representing an average percentage disclosure of social and environmental information of about 48.58% for 
the period. Further, results of the mean measurement for  board size (BSIZE) CEO duality (CEODUAL), 
audit size (AUDSIZE), proportion of non executive directors (PNED) indicate an average board size of 10 
persons which is about two third of the maximum 15 member board as specified in the Securities and 
Exchange Commissions’ Code of Corporate Governance of 2003. CEO duality mean score indicates that 
23% of the selected firms have the same individuals functioning as the Chairman and the CEO while mean 
score for PNED indicates that there is a lesser proportion of non executive directors (41.4%) than executive 
directors on the boards of the firms. 
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Results of the correlation analysis as depicted in table 2 indicate a strong negative correlation between CEO 
duality and corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) r = -0.7082. As further indicated, audit 
size (AUDSIZE), proportion of non executive directors (PNED) and board size (BSIZE) have significant 
positive association with the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED). Interestingly, 
firm size which is the control variable also has a significant positive association with the level of corporate 
social environmental disclosure. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 display the result of the regressions (Anova and model summary) which tested all the stated 
hypotheses (i.e. H1 - H4). The results as summarized in the tables suggest that the 78% variation in the 
dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables suggesting clearly that simultaneously the 
explanatory variables are significantly associated with the dependent variable. The use of multivariate 
hypothesis test is based on the assumption of no significant multicollinearity between the explanatory 
variables. Non-existence of multicollinearity between the  independent variables was confirmed  by 
computing the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each of the explanatory variables  and the mean VIF  as 
depicted in table (5) of 1.71, which is lower than ten (10), a number used  based on a rule of thumb as an 
indicator of multicollinearity problems (Field, 2000). Thus, the VIF coefficient and the residual statistics 
confirm the lack of co linearity and therefore sustained the model.  
 
5. Discussion of findings 
Empirical evidence in this study is consistent with our initially stated a priori expectations (i.e. b1 < 0 and b2, 
b3, b4 > 0). A significant negative relationship was found between CEO duality and level of corporate social 
and environmental disclosure, suggesting a rejection of the null hypothesis 1 which proposed no significant 
relationship between the two variables. This outcome is consistent with the agency theory perspective which 
holds that CEO duality can decrease the effectiveness of monitoring activities and therefore, may weaken 
the corporate social and environmental performance of firms (Desender, 2009). Concentration of power 
according to Finkelstein and D`Aveni (1994) reduces board monitoring effectiveness which in turn can 
result in lack of transparency and high information asymmetry. Nevertheless, this outcome contradicts the 
findings provided in Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Lin (2005) where it was asserted that CEO duality 
creates a necessary and important unity of command at the top of the organization and helps to avoid 
confusion among managers, employees and other stakeholders as to who is the boss and facilitates timely 
and more effective decision-making. 
 
Also consistent with a priori expectation, findings indicated positive relationship between audit size and the 
level of corporate social and environmental disclosure; a significant positive relationship was found between 
audit size and the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure at p = 0.012. Thus, the second null 
hypothesis of no relationship between the variables was also rejected. This outcome supports the findings 
provided in Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994); Ng and Koh (1993) where a positive relationship between the 
size of audit firm and the extent of voluntary disclosure was reported. It is also consistent with the findings 
provided in Ahmed and Karim (2005) that companies audited by the big four audit firms comply more with 
audit requirements than others. They argued that any financial statement certified by any big four audit is 
likely to be more credible than that of the non big four firms. 
 
Findings relating to the third hypothesis indicated a significant positive relationship between the proportion 
of non executive directors on the board and the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure for 
the sampled firms at p< 0.05. This result implies that the higher the proportion of non-executive directors 
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(independent directors) on the board, the more firms are likely to disclose corporate environmental 
information, since non-executive directors are seen as the check and balance mechanism, in ensuring that 
companies act in the best interests of owners and other stakeholders. More so, their presence tends to 
strengthen the board by monitoring the activities of the management, and ensuring that the interests of the 
investors are protected. Interestingly, despite the environmental and contextual differences, this result is in 
tandem with Haniffa and Cooke (2005); Zahra and Stanton (1988) where it was suggested that the 
independent directors are seen as more able to respect with honor the obligations of the company and are 
generally more interested in developing and maintaining the social responsibility of the company since 
doing so may enhance their prestige and honor in society.  
 
Finally, consistent with our a priori expectation, board size was also observed to have a have a significant 
positive relationship with the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure for the sampled firms in 
Nigeria at p = 0.000.  indicating that the larger the number of board members, the higher the tendency for 
companies to report on the environment in the annual report, since pluralism among the board members may 
stimulate environmental attention. Besides, large boards with diverse knowledge are more effective and 
likely to have a higher degree of independence and expertise than smaller boards in ensuring a balance 
between organizational decisions and actions and societal values and corporate legitimacy. This outcome is 
in line with the propositions of Dalton et al. (1999) that larger boards potentially bring more experience and 
knowledge and offer better advice as they are more likely to include experts on specific issues such as 
environmental performance. 
 
 6 Conclusion 
 
 
This study examined the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the level of corporate social and 
environmental disclosures among listed firms in Nigeria and provided evidence to support the arguments 
that significant relationships exist between corporate governance variables and corporate social and 
environmental disclosure. While the study observed a significant negative relationship between CEO duality 
and the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure, significant positive relationships were 
observed between audit size, proportion of independent directors and board size and the level of corporate 
social and environmental disclosure among the listed firms sampled. Interestingly, the control variable (firm 
size) also had a significant positive effect on the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure. The 
study thus concludes that in line with the agency theory perspective, CEO duality tends to reduce the 
effectiveness of monitoring activities and therefore, may weaken the corporate social and environmental 
performance of firms, while audit size is an important determinant in the corporate social and environmental 
performance of firms. These results appear to corroborate the suggestion that larger audit firms in line with 
international standards tend to provide higher quality audit service due to their high degree of expertise and 
specialization.  In addition, the paper noted that the proportion of non-executive directors is yet generally 
lower in relation to executive directors in Nigerian firms. The results which showed that higher proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board is associated with greater disclosure is an indication of the need to 
improve governance practices of firms in this area. It is suggested that since non executive directors 
(independent directors) are less aligned with management, they may be more inclined to support firms to 
disclose a wider range of information to stakeholders, thus potentially conveying information to a wide set 
of stakeholders. 
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 Finally, the paper acknowledges that corporate and environmental disclosure among firm in Nigeria being 
done on a voluntary basis, is still at a low level. The study recommends the need for stronger policy 
statements and actions to encourage firms operating in Nigeria to engage more in sustainability disclosure in 
order to ensure congruence between organizational decisions and actions and societal values and corporate 
legitimacy. 
 
Variables        Observations Mean  Std. Dev  Min.   Max   
CSED 40 24.2925  11.60354 7.5  44.8 
CEODUAL 40   .225  .4229021 0  1 
AUDSIZE 40  .600  .4961389 0  1 
PNED 40 .414  .1066458 .25  .66 
BSIZE 40 10  1.867399 7  14  
FSIZE 40 7.572   3.977855 2.05  15.04 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables under study 
 
 
Variables  CSED  CEODUAL AUDSIZE PNED  BSIZE           FSIZE  
 
CSED  1.0000   
 
CEODUAL -0.7082  1.0000                  
                             ( 0.0000)   
 
AUDSIZE 0.6337  -0.4155  1.0000                    
                           ( 0.0000)  (0.0077)   
 
PNED  0.5894  -0.3843  0.3412  1.0000      
   (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0143)         
BSIZE  0.6263  -0.4847  0.2768  0.2948  1.0000    
   (0.0000)  (0.0014)  (0.0838)  (0.0648)        
FSIZE  0.6587  -0.6278  0.5413  0.3951  0.1855    
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0003)  (0.0116)  (0.2517)  1.0000 
 
 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for variables 
 
 
 
Source   SS   df  MS   
Model   3.03318145  4  .758295362   
 
Residual  1.15087438  35  0.032882125   
Total   4.18405583  39      
Table 3: Anova 
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     CSED Coefficient          Std. Err.                  t       P                   [95%  Cof.               Interval] 
 
CEODUAL -5.172705 3.02095   -1.71      0.096  -11.31202 .9666071 
AUDSIZE  5.668318 2.142001 2.65      0.012  1.315248 10.02139 
PNED 25.07397 9.224085 2.72      0.010  6.328375 43.81957  
BSIZE 2.191034 .5558676 3.94      0.000  1.061375              3.320693  
FSIZE .7372313 .3186041 2.31      0.027  .0897499             1.384713  
CONST -15.81791 7.133264 -2.22      0.033              -30.31445            -1.321378 
No. of Obs. 40 
F (4, 35) 23.06 
Prob  F  0.0000 
R-squared 0.8103 
Adj R-squared 0.7824 
Root MSE 5.4133 
Table 4: Regression result 
 
 
 
 
Variables   VIF   1/VIF 
CEODUAL  2.17   0.460350 
FSIZE  2.14   0.467795 
AUDSIZE  1.50   0.665288 
BSIZE  1.43   0.697330 
PNED  1.29   0.776464 
Mean VIF  1.71 
 
Table 5: Variance Inflation Factor 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1:     LIST OF SELECTYED LISTED FIRMS 
S/
N 
Selected Firms CSED CEO 
DUALITY 
AUDSIZE PNED BSIZE FSIZE 
1 Ashaka Cement Plc 30.5 0 1 0.5 8 10.23 
2 Nigerian Ropes Plc 21.5 0 1 0.44 9 13.34 
3 Dangote Cement Plc 29.5 0 1 0.55 7 14.38 
4 Lafarge WAPCO Nigeria Plc 29.9 0 1 0.56 10 11.5 
5 CCNN PLC 35.5 0 1 0.56 10 7.52 
6 Nigerian Wire Industries Plc 9.5 1 1 0.45 8 4.72 
7 Portland Cement & Products 
Nig. Plc 31.1 0 1 0.34 10 12.89 
8 Guinness Nigeria Plc 39.5 0 1 0.45 11 13.00 
9 Nigerian Bottling Company 
Plc 42.5 0 1 0.56 10 15.04 
10 Nigerian Brewery  41.5 0 1 0.61 10 10.11 
11 CAP Nigeria Plc 8.5 1 1 0.27 9 3.27 
12 IPWA Plc 12.5 0 1 0.34 9 3.35 
13 Paints & Coatings 
Manufacturers Nig.  Plc 23.3 0 1 0.33 9 11.4 
14 Premier Paints Plc 15.5 0 0 0.25 8 13.41 
15 African paints (Nigeria) plc 11.3 1 0 0.42 8 3.45 
16 Berger paints plc 23.3 0 0 0.53 12 7.46 
17 African Petroleum Plc 29.5 0 1 0.44 10 11.57 
18 Total Nigeria plc 38.5 0 1 0.34 12 12.64 
19 Afroil Plc 34.5 0 1 0.45 12 10.71 
20 Beco Petroleum Products plc 37.9 0 1 0.55 14 12.6 
21 Conoil Plc 42.1 0 1 0.44 14 6.3 
22 Eterna Oil and Gas Company 
Plc 28.1 0 1 0.54 12 6.3 
23 Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc 44.8 0 1 0.33 13 6.31 
24 Oando Plc 43.1 0 1 0.66 12 6.36 
25 Ecobank Nigeria Plc 20.5 0 0 0.45 11 6.37 
26 First Bank of Nigeria Plc 21.5 0 0 0.46 13 6.36 
27 United Bank for Africa Plc 21.5 0 1 0.34 12 6.59 
28 Zenith bank Plc 26.5 0 0 0.37 12 6.71 
29 Cadbury Nigeria Plc 23.5 0 1 0.25 11 5.86 
30 Flour mills of Nigeria plc 21.5 0 0 0.34 9 7.00 
31 Honeywell Flour Mills Plc 13.5 0 0 0.3 9 2.44 
32 7-up Bottling Company Plc 26.5 0 1 0.34 8 7.4 
33 Nestle Nigeria Plc 17.5 0 0 0.45 9 3.36 
34 National salt company 
(Nigeria) plc 21.5 0 0 0.44 9 7.41 
35 Costain (West Africa) plc 7.5 1 0 0.36 8 2.46 
36 Julius Berger Nigeria Plc. 10.4 1 0 0.32 9 2.6 
37 Beta Glass Company Plc 8 1 0 0.33 9 2.94 
38 Vita foam (nig.) Plc 10.4 1 0 0.29 8 2.99 
39 Neimeth International Pharma 
Plc 9.3 1 0 0.33 8 2.05 
40 B. O. C. Gases Plc 8.2 1 0 0.28 8 2.48 
Source: Computed from Annual Report and Corporate Websites (2006-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Journal of Business and Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No.5 , pp 76-92, August 2013.              P.P.  76 - 92 URL: http://www.ejbss.com/recent.aspx ISSN: 2235 -767X 
 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
92 
APPENDIX 2:     CONTENT CATEGORY DATA 
Disclosures in terms of Themes 
S/
N 
Environment Energy Research & 
Development 
Employee Health and 
Safety 
Community Involvement 
 
1 Environmental 
pollution 
Firms energy 
policies 
Investment in 
research on 
renewal tech. 
Disclosing accident 
statistics 
Donations of cash, 
products or employees 
services 
2 Conservation of 
natural 
resources 
Disclosing 
energy savings 
Environmental 
education 
Reducing or eliminating 
pollutants/irritants/hazards 
in the work environment 
Summer or part-time 
employment of students 
3 Environmental 
management/ 
policies 
Reduction  in 
energy 
 consumption 
 
Environmental 
research 
 
Promoting employee safety 
and physical or mental 
health  
 
Sponsoring public health 
projects 
 
4 Recycling plant 
of waste 
products 
Received 
awards or 
penalties 
Waste 
management/ 
reduction and 
recycling tech. 
Disclosing benefits from 
increased health and safety 
expenditure 
Aiding medical research 
 
5 Air emission 
information 
Disclosing 
increased energy  
efficiency 
products 
Research on new 
method  
of production 
Complying with health and 
safety standards and 
regulations and 
Establishment of 
Educational Institution 
Funding scholarship 
programmes or activities 
6 Pollution 
Control 
Measures  
Utilizing waste 
materials for 
energy 
production 
Environmental 
impact Survey 
Research 
Providing low cost health 
care for employees 
Donations to charity. Art, 
sports etc. 
 
7 Land 
remediation and 
Containment 
Conservation of 
energy in the 
conduct of 
business 
operations. 
 
Environmental 
Impact Assessment 
Analysis 
Providing information on 
the company/management 
relationships with the 
employees in an effort to 
improve job satisfaction 
and employee motivation 
Sponsoring educational 
conferences, seminars or 
art exhibitions 
Disclosures in terms of Evidence 
1 Monetary Quantitative: All statement expressing factual information concerning firms’ pollution activities expressed in 
monetary terms. 
2 Non-monetary Quantitative: All statement expressing factual quantitative information concerning a firm’s pollution 
activities expressed in qualitative terms or non-monetary terms 
3 Quantitative monetary and non-monetary: All statement expressing factual information concerning a firm’s pollution 
activities expressed both in monetary and non-monetary terms.  
4 Declarative: A statement of opinion or unsupported declaration concerning firm’s pollution activities. It includes 
qualitative information expressed in descriptive terms.  
Disclosure in terms of Location 
1 Financial statement  
2 Operation reviews discussions on environmental issues 
3 General environmental information disclosed or discussed in the Chairman’s statement 
4 General environmental information disclosed or discussed in the corporate diary 
5 General environmental information disclosed or discussed on the corporate webpage  
Disclosures in terms of News type 
1 Good: statements that reflect credit to the company 
2 Neutral: statements whose credit/discredit for the company is not obvious 
3 Bad: statements that reflect discredit to the company 
Disclosures in terms of Time 
 Time 
1 Present: a statement referencing present events or situations 
2 Future: a statement referencing future events or situations. 
3 Past: a statement referencing past events or situations. 
Source: Adapted from Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Nassr and Fathi, 2010) 
 
